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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact on price dynamics of price continuity-depth
requirements that restrict transaction-to-transaction price changes when some
traders possess private information about asset values. Price continuity rules
enable insiders to slowly exploit their information over time. Paradoxically,
more stringent price continuity requirements may actually improve market
efficiency indirectly by increasing insider profits and inducing more traders to
become informed at cost. We also demonstrate that the autocorrelation in
returns induced by price-continuity rules provides a rationale for the use of
technical trading rules by outsiders who effectively 'free-ride' off the private
information of insiders. We show that price continuity requirements can make
both insiders and outsiders better off by reducing the rents to market makers.
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1 Introduction
In many markets, the prices set by market makers must satisfy price continuity-depth
requirements. Yet, these rules have largely been ignored in both theoretical and empirical
analyses of market microstructure.1 This paper examines the effects of price continuity
requirements on price formation and market efficiency.
The simplest price continuity rules place upper limits on the absolute change in price
during trading hours.2 More sophisticated rules link the allowable change in price to order
flow. For example, New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Rule 104 requires the specialist to
maintain a 'fair and orderly market.' To achieve this, the NYSE provides price continuity-
depth guidelines to its specialists that vary across stocks and are determined by the price
range and normal trading volume of the stock. For instance, a stock trading between $20
and $29 | with average daily share volume in the previous month (excluding trades of
25,000 or more) of 10.000-24,999, the maximum price change permissible for volume of
3,000 shares is $ | . The NYSE reports that in 1988, 92.1% of all transactions of 1,000
shares or less traded with a price change of 0 or | from the immediately preceding trade.
Adherence to these guidelines is one criterion by which specialists are evaluated, and
accordingly specialists who perform poorly according to these measures risk having their
stocks reassigned to others or not being assigned more profitable stocks in the future.
Usually there are special provisions for suspending continuity requirements after a public
announcement. On the NYSE for example, the specialist can call a trading halt (with the
permission of a floor official) in the event of an impending public announcement.
Price continuity rules are usually justified as a way to maintain price stability for
'small' investors. However, there may be a trade-off between price stability and market
efficiency. In an early analysis of the problem, Black (1971) notes:
There is a right amount of price continuity for every stock under any given
"Black (1971) was the first to discuss the effect of price continuity requirements. Hamao and Hasbrouck
(1992) examine empirically the effect of continuity rules on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
2In futures markets, these limits are intended to act as circuit breakers in the event of an extremely
unusual event such as a crash.
set of market conditions, and either more or less than that is undesirable.
Large changes in price caused by the arrival of new information affecting the
value of the stock are desirable. Large changes in price that are caused by a
temporary imbalance between supply and demand are undesirable.
Black's comments suggest the existence of an 'optimal' level of exchange-mandated price
continuity. In this paper, we examine whether there exists an economic rationale for price
continuity rules, and their implications for transaction prices.
We consider the following model: A group of traders (or insiders) possess private
information concerning the full-information value of a security. Insiders and uninformed
traders without private information trade in the market until a random date at which time
the full-information price is publicly revealed. In each period, a market maker who acts as
a trader of last resort determines the asset's price, subject to price continuity requirements
of the types discussed above.3 In this paper, we analyze the effect on price formation and
market efficiency of continuity-depth requirements that restrict price movements when
some traders possess private information.
Since informed traders are always on one side of the market, either buying or selling,
their trading creates price trends when price movements are limited by continuity require-
ments. This prediction is consistent with empirical evidence that successive transactions
on the NYSE tend to occur on the same side of the quote. We also analyze the impact
on price formation and efficiency of changes in price continuity rules. In equilibrium, if
the number of insiders is fixed, price continuity requirements do not affect the rate of
convergence of prices. As a result, if private information can be acquired at cost, more
stringent price continuity requirements actually increase market efficiency by increasing
the rewards to becoming informed. However, this leads to the duplication of investment
in the production of short-term information that will soon become public, imposing social
costs.
3In existing models of trading under asymmetric information, e.g., Kyle (1985), prices are not
restricted.
Finally, we analyze the optimal price continuity rule under alternative criteria for an
exchange. We demonstrate an important rationale for the existence of price continuity
rules; restrictions on price movements limit the market power of market makers who
may otherwise move prices significantly in response to order flow, thereby narrowing the
effective bid-ask spread and increasing the welfare of all investors.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2 we set up the model, and
describe the strategic choices of the players. Section 3 analyzes the strategies of a mo-
nopolistic insider, and in Section 4, we analyze the multiple insider case. The analysis
is extended in Section 5 to the case where traders can acquire information at cost. In
Section 7, we discuss the determination of an optimal price continuity rule. Finally, Sec-
tion 8 summarizes the paper and offers suggestions for further research. Proofs are in the
appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 The Structure of Trading
Consider the market for a single risky asset that can be traded at dates t — 1,2,.. . , f.
The security is a claim to the cash flows from a project which begins to yield revenue
or dividends at a random date f in the future. The dividend paid at time t(t > r) is
denoted by dt. We assume dt is independently drawn from a distribution with unknown
mean d > 0. The event date r is an integer-valued random variable: on this date the
mean of the dividend process d is publicly announced and the first (random) dividend
payment is made. The announcement is made just before trading in that period begins.
As an aside, date r can be interpreted as the time when news of an impending news event
first becomes public (as opposed to the event day itself), allowing the market maker to
halt trading according to exchange rules. We assume that the probability that the event
occurs in the next period, given no announcements to date, is o G (0.1). In other words,
the time to revelation is geometrically distributed, and is thus independent of the elapsed
time.
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With these assumptions, the expected value of the security is simply the expected
present value of the stochastic stream of dividends. Let r > 0 denote the risk-free rate of
interest, and denote by v the expected value of future dividends given private information
about d. Hence, the probability that the event occurs t periods from now is (1 — oY'1^.
The expected present discounted value of the dividend stream starting t periods from
now is j , ^ , , . Consequently, the expected value of the asset in any period prior to the
announcement date is a constant equal to:
We turn to a formal description of the objectives and information of market participants.
The stochastic structure of the economy is common knowledge. The focus of the paper
is on the behavior of two group of traders. The first group is referred to as insiders or
informed traders and they obtain private information regarding the mean of the dividend
process, d, at time 0. Insiders are assumed to be risk-neutral. In particular, we are
interested in the question of how insiders profitably exploit their information in the pre-
event epoch and the effect of their strategies on price dynamics. There are N > 1 insiders,
indexed by i = 1 , . . . , N. Let qn represent the order quantity of informed trader i with
the convention that q > 0 denotes a trader purchase and q < 0 a trader sale.
In addition to traders with private information, other agents with no private infor-
mation, referred to as outsiders or uninformed traders, also trade. These traders are
liquidity- motivated and their trade, xt, is a random variable that is independent across
time-periods with mean zero and variance cr^ , where x > 0 (x < 0) denotes net purchase
(sale) as before.of trading, such as Kyle (1985) or Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), serving
to camouflage the actions of insiders.
Denote by pt the security's price at time t. The price is determined by a single
market maker or specialist on the basis of the net order flow in period t, denoted by
Qt = H»V <lit -r xt- Only market orders can be submitted and the specialist is required to
fill all orders.
2.2 Price Continuity Requirements
We assume that the market maker is subject to a price continuity-depth requirement
of the form \pt — pt-\\ < AQt. This rule states that the maximum permissable price
revision is linearly related to the net order imbalance facing the specialist in period t, and
is consistent with the types of continuity rules in use in equity markets. The coefficient
A > 0 summarizes the liquidity of the market, with lower values of A implying more shares
can be traded for a given price change. We define market depth as A"1, the minimum
order flow associated with a unit price change, a definition analogous to that in Kyle
(1985). In Section 5 we analyze an alternative price continuity rule where the price
adjustments are linked to past and current volume and show that our results extend to
this more complicated case.4 When the dividend announcement is made at time r, we
assume prices adjust to the new level implied by the release of dividend information, i.e.,
the market maker calls a trading halt and revises prices while the continuity rules are
suspended.
To focus attention on the effect of the price continuity rule imposed upon the market
maker, we assume that the requirement is always binding, i.e., the market maker sets
the highest (lowest) permissable price when faced with a net buy (sell) order imbalance.
This assumption is consistent with a market maker who maximizes expected profits in
each period. Accordingly, the price revision rule can be written as a linear function.
Pt = Pt-\ + A(Jt. Such price behavior could also be viewed, following Hakansson, Beja,
and Kale (1985), as a representation of the price adjustment process in an automated
trading system that does not require dealers.
A linear price adjustment rule also arises in Kyle (1985). However, in our model.
the market depth is determined by the exchanges whereas in Kyle's model, it originates
endogenously from the learning process of an uninformed market maker. For appropriate
values of A, our model yields the Kyle model. Our focus, however, is on the effects of
4The case of price limits independent of volume are not analyzed here. Such price limits are primarily
designed to act as circuit breakers in the event of an exceptional event, such as the October 1987 crash,
and not to maintain short- run price stability.
binding price continuity requirements on price formation.
2.3 Trader's Strategies
Having described the market environment, we turn now to a description of the strategic
behavior of informed traders. Suppose there are N informed traders. At time t, trader
i (i = l , . . . . iV) submits an order qa based on all available information including the
previous trading history generated by past prices and quantities and the anticipation of
the price (which we write as Pt{Qt)) set by the specialist given the strategies of the other
traders. A strategy for an informed trader is a decision rule to select the order quantity q±t
as a function of the particular history observed. The decision rules are said to be Markov
(or history independent) if they depend only on the beginning period price, pt~\.
A vector of strategies forms a Nash equilibrium if each player's strategy maximizes
discounted profits evaluated at date 0, conditional upon the strategies of all other players
being correctly conjectured. A vector of strategies form a sub-game -perfect equilibrium if,
after each history, the continuation strategies, form a Nash equilibrium in the remaining
game. A sub- game perfect equilibrium is a Markov perfect equilibrium if the decision
rules are Markov. In this paper we consider subgame perfect equilibria in the trading
game.
3 The Monopolist Insider
To develop the intuition for our results, we consider first the case where there is a single
insider. The optimization problem faced by a monopolist insider is:
v1- (v - pt)qt
max E 2)
where pt = pt-i + \qt + \xt with probability 1 — 6 and v with probability <z>. The expectation
in (1) is taken over f and i t . 5 After f. the security pays a liquidating dividend and all
trading ceases.
°The initial price p0 is the unconditional expectation of the value of the security at time 0.
Observe that the price continuity requirement on price adjustment implies the insider's
trading problem is intertemporal in nature. If the security is undervalued initially, insider
purchases lead to price increases, lowering potential profits in the future. We will show
that the optimal dynamic strategy is to trade a fixed proportion of the deviation between
the market price and the value of the asset.
Let V(pt-i) denote the value function corresponding to the optimization problem (1)
for any time t < r. The associated optimality equation is (using the Bellman principle):
V(pt-x) = max E {(v - pt-i - Mt - *xt)qt + 0V(pt-i + Xqt + Axt)] , (3)
where 3 = y ~ is the effective discount factor. Note, that although the pre-event trading
period lasts (with probability 1) a finite number of periods, the appropriate horizon for
the insider's decision problem is infinite. This is because at every date in the pre-event
period, there is a positive probability that the insider's information will remain private
for another period.
It will be analytically convenient to consider as a basic state variable the deviation of
price from true value rather than the price itself. Accordingly, define zt-\ = v — pt-\ as
the state variable and denote by W the associated value function. Of course, W(zt-\) =
V(v-zt_x).
Proposition 1 For t < r, the optimal trading strategy of the monopolist insider is a
linear function of the price deviation:
) = 0* , (4)
where 0 is inversely proportional to A. Further, the value function is:
i.e., discounted profits are a quadratic function of the initial price deviation. Further,
expected prices converge geometrically to the true value of the asset:
E\zt] =ia{l -o)Yz{)
where a — a{[3) E (0,1) and ")(&) are constants described in the appendix. In particular,
a is independent of the continuity-depth parameter A.
Remarks : The parameter a is a metric for market efficiency since it is the rate at which
prices converge to the full information value in the pre-event period. Prices jump to the
present value of future dividends following the earnings announcement.6 Lower values of a
are associated with greater market efficiency, i.e., faster rates of convergence. Proposition
1 shows that the continuity-depth parameter A does not effect the rate of convergence of
prices, a.
Proposition 1 forms an important benchmark case where the insider is a monopolist.
The trader's strategy is such that the rate of price convergence is independent of market
depth. The effect on insider's profits of market depth is determined by the amount of
initial mispricing z0. If this is high, more stringent price continuity rules allow an insider
to extract larger rents by trading bigger volume (although price dynamics are unchanged
in A). If ZQ is small, and an insider does not wish to trade much, more stringent price
continuity rules have the adverse effect of making prices insensitive to liquidity trading.
So, for large mispricing, the effect of more stringent price continuity rules (i.e.. lower A) is
not to slow the rate at which private information is impounded in prices, but to increase
the informational rents of the insider.
4 Multiple Insiders
In this section, we are concerned with the analysis of price dynamics resulting from com-
petition among insiders and later on competition with outsiders.7 Purely for notational
ease in the immediate sequel we discuss the case where N = 2. The generalization of our
results to N > 2 is straightforward (and is presented at the end of the proof of Proposition
nMeulbroek (1991) examines the stock price run-up before takeovers and finds price paths suggestive
of the slow exploitation of information by insiders. In particular, she finds that 43 percent of the run-up
in the 20 days before the announcement occurs on days when insiders traded.
'See also Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), who analyze the effect of competition among insiders
in a dynamic model. In their model, market makers are not constrained by price continuity rules. The
focus of our analysis is on the consequences of such rules on price formation.
2). Again for notational ease we ignore strategic uninformed traders in the present sec-
tion, and focus exclusively on the competition between informed traders, in the presence
of liquidity motivated noise traders.








where pt = p t-i + ^(<lit + <Ijt(Pt-i)) + ^xt- As in the monopolist insider case, it is con-
venient to think of trader i as the residual trader who picks the deviation of price from
fundamentals in the next period. Let zt-\ — v — pt-\ be the current price deviation. Then,
writing W{ for the value function for trader i. some algebra yields the following Bellman
equation8 for the trader:
zt(zt-i - zt - \qj(zt_i) - \xt)i(zt-i) = max.fi1
A
where fi = (I — ®)/(l + r) and zt is the next period's price deviation. Suppose now that
trader j's strategy is a linear function of the price deviation:
qJ(zt)=0Jzt, (8)
where Oj > 0. Such a strategy is motivated by the linearity of the monopolist insider's
optimal trading strategy. We explore two elements of the analysis: the optimal trading
strategy or best response of insider i as a residual trader and. secondly, the existence and
character of equilibria in linear strategies.
The following result establishes that there exists a 0* £ (0, j^) such that if Oj = 0",
then the best response of trader i is a linear trading rule with 0, = 0*. In this equilibrium,
prices converge geometrically to v at a rate faster than the monopolist insider case.
Proposition 2 There is a proportional trading rule 0*z for the insiders, which constitutes
a Markov-perfect equilibrium given the linear adjustment rule pt = pt_x -f \Qt for the
"The value function W{ will depend on trader ;'s trading strategy g;, and should therefore be written
as Wi(-;qj). However, in the immediate sequel we will construct a particular form for qj and the value
function will refer to this strategy.
specialist. The expected rate of price convergence is geometric:
-o)yz0, (9)
where cxo € (0,1) is a constant. Further, 0.2 < a . i.e., the rate of convergence of prices is
faster with 2 traders than with a monopolist insider.
Proposition 2 describes the unique symmetric equilibrium when traders adopt linear
Markov strategies. Expected discounted profits are given by:






 + -^ A
"' 1 - J 2
(10)
We discuss the relationship between the continuity-depth parameter A and the rate of
price convergence later.
5 Continuity Requirements and Market Efficiency
We now investigate the variation in equilibrium behavior as the market primitives, the
number of informed traders N and the market liquidity A, change. We examine the effect
of varying (iV, A) on price efficiency and the size of informational rents.
Recall that the (symmetric) equilibrium strategies are given by: each informed trader
trades 0(N.X)[v — pt-i] at price pt_x and discounted expected profits are " (v — pQj2 -f
£(N, A) if the initial price is p0. Moreover, in the rounds before disclosure, prices converge
geometrically at the rate 1 — N\6(N,\) = a(iV, A). Proposition 3 examines the effect of
changes in N and A on market efficiency and profits.
Proposition 3 In a symmetric Markov equilibrium:
1. The rate of price convergence a is independent of market liquidity A.
2. However, a is a declining function of the number of insiders N.
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3. Insiders' profits W(ZQ;N, A) are decreasing (increasing) in A if the initial price de-
viation ZQ IS greater (less) than z(\).
4. The value function W(zo;N,\) is decreasing in N for every initial price deviation
zo = v- p0.
5. The total losses of market makers is decreasing in N.
The proposition shows that for a fixed number of informed traders, price efficiency, as
measured by a, is independent of the continuity-depth parameter A. As expected, prices
are more efficient with a greater number of informed traders. An immediate corollary of
proposition 3 is that the trading proportion 0(N,\) is inversely proportional to A, i.e..
given a more continuous price regime, in equilibrium all traders exactly offset the potential
increase in smoothing by larger volume of transactions. The intuition underlying the effect
on total profits of a change in the price continuity rule A, is similar to the monopoly case.
Consider a lowering of A. This relieves price pressure consequent upon any insider trade,
provided the insiders do want to trade at current prices, i.e., provided z is large. If z is
small, a lower A means that liquidity trading is less likely to make z larger; this affects
insider TT adversely. On the other hand an increase in the number of informed traders
reduces informational rents.
In our analysis so far. we have assumed that some traders are exogenously endowed
with private information. Suppose now that traders can endogenously determine whether
or not to become informed at cost. We assume that there is a pre-game round in which the
number of insiders is determined endogenously. The payoffs to this game are determined
by insider profits in the subsequent trading rounds, which depends on the total num-
ber of traders who choose to become informed. The Nash equilibrium for the pre-game
determines the number of insiders.
Formally, suppose at time 0, a trader can become informed at cost c > 0. If the
current price is p and the number of other informed traders is N — 1, then the expected
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returns to becoming informed is:
R*(P) = rW(v-P;N,X)df(v)-c (11)
Jo
)-c (12)
where / is the prior density of v given public information.
Indeed, the total profits can written, using the results in the appendix, as:
where g{N) is known from Proposition 3 to be a decreasing function. Writing %J{p) =




A ^ 1 - 0 2 A
Clearly the larger the expected deviation of current price from the true value, the greater
the number of informed traders. The number of insiders will also depend on the continuity-
depth parameter A. as shown by the following proposition:
Proposition 4 // traders can acquire information at cost, stricter price continuity-depth
requirements (i.e., lower values of X) are associated with faster price convergence (i.e.,
>nth lower values of a), if and only if ^ > -^~ ^-.
Proposition 4 implies that more stringent price continuity rules can. in some circum-
stances, improve efficiency. At first glance, this result appears counter-intuitive. The
intuition, however, is straightforward: Lower values of A increase the expected profits
of insiders, inducing a higher Ar*, and implying faster price convergence. From a policy
viewpoint this is not necessarily the best way to increase market efficiency, however, since
it induces a larger number of socially wasteful searches.
Since variations of the price continuity rule studied in this paper are also observed in
security markets, it is worth exploring the robustness of our results to such variations.
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In particular, the form of the NYSE guidelines for transaction-to-transaction price move-
ments suggest a price continuity rule which restricts the price changes in the t-th round
to some moving average of volume in current and immediately preceding trading rounds.
Consider a rule such as:
Pt = pt-i + A [iQ,-! + \Qt\ , (13)
where price change is limited by the average volume in the current and preceding round.
Clearly, (12) is equivalent to (the notationally simpler) price revision rule pt = pt_x +
X[Qt-i + Qt], where A = |A. In the rest of this section we will demonstrate that our
conclusions are qualitatively unaffected by this variation. In particular, we will analyze
in detail the (notationally simpler) case of a monopolistic insider and show that the
conclusions remain unchanged. The reader can verify that the same is true for the multiple
insiders case.
The following proposition characterizes the consequent price dynamics and the in-
sider's profits.
Proposition 5 For t < r, the optimal trading strategy of the monopolist insider is a
linear function of the price deviation and the aggregate quantity traded in the previous
round:
q;(zt-l) = elzt-l-(i-o2)Qt-i, (H)
where 0\ is inversely proportional to A. whereas B^_ is independent of X. Further, the value
function is:
(£± lA +czt-l Qt-i , (15)-X) aX + b 
where a, b, c are constants independent of X, i.e., discounted profits are a quadratic function
oj the initial price deviation and volume. Further, expected prices converge to the true
value of the asset at a rate which is independent of the continuity-depth parameter X.
The proposition shows that our analysis can be extended straightforwardly to more com-
plicated price continuity rules based on moving averages of volume as opposed to current
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volume alone. Our basic conclusions in this more complex case are unaltered, so from this
point onward we will assume the continuity rule is a function of current volume alone.
6 The Optimal Price Continuity Rule
In this section, we derive the optimal price continuity rule within the linear class under a
set of alternative criteria. In doing so, we provide an economic rationale for the existence
of such rules.9 For simplicity, we restrict our attention to the base case where the number
of informed traders is exogenous and there are no strategic outsiders.10 We begin with a
set of possible selection criteria for the exchange, within the class of linear rules:
(Cl) Minimize excess volatility subject to non-negative expected discounted profits for
the specialist.
(C2) Maximize the combined expected profits of insiders and outside investors subject to
non-negative expected discounted profits for the specialist.
(C3) Maximize market liquidity (depth) subject to non-negative expected discounted
profits for the specialist.
(C4) Allow the specialist to select the continuity parameter A subject to excess price
variability being bounded by a constant, L.
Criterion (Cl) is usually cited as the main reason for maintaining continuity rules.
The term 'excess volatility' requires further explanation. Price movements reflect two
components: a permanent component warranted by fundamentals, and a transitory com-
ponent induced by noise trading. Attempting to minimize the former component only
reduces market efficiency and is not a viable alternative in the long run. (Actually, both
short- and long-run objectives yield the same rule, but minimizing short-run temporary
price shocks is a more natural goal.) The other selection criteria are self-explanatory.
and coincide with the stated objectives of exchanges. While criteria (C1)-(C3) impose
restrictions on the specialist directly, (C4) allows the specialist to choose the linear rule
'-""We thank the referee for suggesting this to us.
10It is straightforward to extend our results to these more general cases; our qualitative results are
unchanged.
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subject to a constraint on price variability. Another reasonable criterion is to maximize
price efficiency subject to constraints on specialist profits. This objective is not included
because the rate of price convergence in our model is independent of the choice of the
continuity rule. The following proposition establishes that there exists an unique price
continuity rule satisfying all four selection criteria.
Proposition 6 There exists an unique linear "price continuity rule satisfying criteria
(Cl)-(C3), and an upper bound L* such that this rule will be selected by the specialist
in accordance with (C4)- Further, for L > L*, the expected profits of the specialist are
strictly positive and increase with L.
Remarks: Proposition 8 has two important implications: First, there exists a continuity
rule consistent with all four exchange objectives. Continuity rules can increase liquidity,
improve price stability in the short-run, and maximize the net gains of all traders. Second,
continuity rules limit the expected profits of the specialist. Transitory order imbalances
originating from liquidity traders can cause price movements attributable to 'bid-ask
bounce.' Price continuity requirements are usually justified as a method of reducing price
volatility that is not warranted by changes in fundamentals. However, without restrictions
of some sort on permissible price movements, a non-competitive market maker would
set raise (lower) prices when faced with excess demand (supply), thereby widening the
effective bid-ask spread and price variability. Thus, proposition 8 provides a rationale for
the existence of continuity rules in a market where dealers possess market power.
In the appendix, we prove that the optimal continuity-depth parameter is inversely
related to the standard deviation of noise trading, i.e., to ax. Intuitively, if the expected
volume of noise trading increases, maintaining price stability requires a less sensitive price
adjustment rule. Similarly, with greater noise trading, a smaller continuity parameter is
required to maintain a given level of specialist expected profits. This discussion suggests
that the optimal price continuity-depth parameter vary by security, with thickly traded
securities having more stringent continuity requirements.
15
7 Conclusions
In many security markets, there are institutional barriers to price movements, but there
has been little analysis of the effect of such rules on price formation. This paper ana-
lyzes the impact on price dynamics of price continuity-depth requirements that restrict
price changes when some traders possess private information about asset values. Price
continuity rules enable insiders to slowly exploit their information over time. We show
that irrespective of the number of insiders, the rate of convergence of prices to the full-
information value is independent of the price continuity requirements since insiders adjust
their rate of trading according to the continuity requirements. Paradoxically, more strin-
gent price continuity requirements may actually improve market efficiency indirectly by
increasing insider profits and inducing more traders to become informed at cost.
We analyze the exchanges choice of a price continuity rule under alternative selec-
tion criteria. We demonstrate an important rationale for the existence of price continuity
rules; restrictions on price movements limit the market power of market makers who may
otherwise move prices significantly in response to order flow. There exists an optimal
continuity rule that maximizes the total expected profits of traders and also minimizes
transaction-to-transaction price movements subject to a non- negativity constraint on
market maker expected profits. The optimal continuity rule is shown to vary systemati-
cally with the expected volume of liquidity trading, with active securities subject to more
stringent requirements than thinly traded securities.
Finally, the analysis raises some interesting theoretical and empirical issues that lie
beyond the scope of this paper. First, the model suggests a positive relation between
the continuity parameter and market maker profits, given the expected volume of trad-
ing. This relation could be tested using intraday data on market maker positions such
as those used by Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1992). Second, the model implies that the
expected price change, conditional upon current information, is positively related to the
current price change. This relation could also be tested on a transaction basis using intra-
day data, but requires some care in that the effect of continuity rules may be obscured by
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other microstructure effects such as inventory control by market makers, non-trading, or
bid-ask bounce. Indeed, recent studies of intraday returns (e.g., Hasbrouck (1991)) sug-
gest significant departures from the martingale property implicit in standard asymmetric
information models. A cleaner test may be obtained by focusing on intraday returns prior
to trading suspensions. Third, the use of technical trading strategies by outsiders may in-
duce other forms of technical analysis. For example, suppose that no traders obtain private
information in the pre-event period. Under the technical strategy analyzed above, a price
increase triggered by noise traders leads to buying and hence future price increases, as
technical traders chase a false trend. As this event occurs with positive probability, there
is a potential profit opportunity for technical traders who pursue counter-cyclical trading
strategies, i.e.. selling (buying) following a price increase (decrease). These traders, who
act as market makers by supplying liquidity, earn positive expected profits in periods
when there happen to be no informed traders buy systematically lose when some traders
do in fact possess private information. Thus, the pre-event period may be characterized
by unusually high volume. These are topics for future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
From the insider's perspective, the price schedule takes the form:
Pt = Pt-i + <^7t + Ax<. (A.I





where from equation (A.I), pt = p<_i + A<^  + Xxt with probability 1 — 6 and u with
probability <z>. Let V7pt_i) denote the value function corresponding to the optimization
problem (A.2) for any time t < r. The Bellman equation yields:
t-\) = max E [(v — pt_i — Xqt — Xxt)qt + j3V(pt-i-{• Xqt + Xxt)] , (A.3)
where /3 = j ^ . Rewriting (A.3) by using z = v — p t_! and W(z) = V(pt-\) we obtain:
W(z) = max E [(z - Xq - Xx)q + /?W(* - A^  - Ax)] . (A.4)
Without loss of generality, suppose the deviation between v and the previous price. p*_i,
is z at the start of the period. Let y = z — Xq — Xx be the deviation between value and
price that results from a trade of size q by the insider and x by the noise traders. In other
words, y is the price deviation in the next period, and is a random variable because x is
stochastic.
The trader's choice problem then is equivalent to the choice of the expected deviation
z — Xq = y conditional upon there being no information announcement. Equation (A.4)
yields:
I" (z — y\ . 1W(z) = maxi? \y —:— + j3W\y)\
y L V A / J
which can be simplified to
W(z) = max \y (^^-) + 0EW(y - Xx)] . (A.5)
y L \ A / J
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Note that in (A.5) the expectation is taken over x. Let the stationary optimal policy







The envelope theorem yields:
W(z) = M . (A.7)
Consider solutions of the form W(z) = I + | ^ 2 and h(z) = az. Substituting these in
(A.6)-(A.7) yields
z(l - 2a) + flkaz = 0
which upon simplification leads to
0 . (A.8)
Similarly from (A.7) we get:
k=j. (A.9)
Equations (A.8) and (A.9) solve to yield optimal values of k and a. In particular, a little
algebra reveals that a may be derived from the following quadratic function
(la2 - 2a + 1 = 0 .
The quadratic has two roots. One root yields a > 1 and implies an expected price path
which is explosive. This clearly cannot be part of an optimal trading strategy of the insider
since it implies that he consistently buys overvalued stock and sells, in turn, undervalued
stock. Therefore, the only meaningful solution to the quadratic is:




Substituting all of this back into the Bellman equation (A.5) we get
which yields
3 a
 \ 2 ~ l ~
~ 1 -3 2 Gx ~ ~~%
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From standard arguments we then know that as a solution to the optimality equation, W
is uniquely denned as the value function. The first order condition (A.6) is also a sufficient
condition for optimality if the maximand is concave. The only term of any consequence
in the right hand side of (A.5) is the coefficient of y2, which is 4p — 1, and this coefficient
is negative so that the maximization problem is in fact strictly concave. Further az is the
unique trading strategy which maximizes a risk-neutral informed trader's expected profits
when faced with a linear price adjustment schedule operated by the specialist. From the
strict concavity of the objective in (A.5), the uniqueness of the optimal trading strategy
follows.
Recall Q = h(z)/z where h(z) = z — \q*(z). Here q'(z) is the optimal trading volume
at price deviation z. This implies that a = 1 — A2-^-, so that:
q(z)={^^z = 0z, (A.ll)
where:
Proof of Proposition 2:
We first characterize the best response of trader i given that j adopts a linear strategy.
Then we discuss the equilibrium conditions. Rewriting (6) we obtain:




Denote the stationary policy for this problem by h{{z). Assuming for the moment that
W{ is in fact differentiate, the optimal choice must satisfy the following first-order and
envelope conditions:
(i-xe^z-'ihiz)
 + 0E[w,{h{z) _ Xx)] = 0 ^ (
and
w!{z) = <i-y»c>. (
A
Consider a solution of the form, Wi(z) = | z2 -f L h(z) — a2z. Substituting these in
(A.14)-(A.15) yields:




(1 - A^) - 2a2 + #(1 - \9j)al = 0 .
From (A.17) it follows that:
W)—• (Aa8)
Equation (A. 18) suggests the possibility of cyclical behavior (i.e., a2 < 0), stable mono-
tone price convergence (i.e., a2 G (0,1)), or even unstable monotone explosive behavior
i.e.. a2 > 1). We analyze the cyclical and monotone explosive cases below and show
in particular that such behavior cannot arise in equilibrium. We begin with the case:
1 — XOj £ (0,1), i.e., a situation in which, in the absence of any noise trade and trade by
i. sgn(zt) =
Lemma 1 Suppose (1 — \6j) > 0. Then, under the best response of trader i,
1. If E[zt+X\ > zu then E[zt+2] > E[*t+i]- Conversely, if E[zt+i] < zt, then E[zt+2] <
^(2t+i]i l'«c., the expected price deviation is either monotonically increasing or de-
creasing. Further, sign(zt) = s\ga{E[zt+l\).
2. The rate of convergence of prices is:
3. The rate of adjustment a2 is decreasing in 0j.
Proof of Lemma 1:
Consider the Bellman equation (A. 13). Denote the maximand by U(z,y). We wiil
show that U is a strictly super-modular function. (A function U(z.y) is super-modular
if. for ail z' > z,y' > y7 U(z',y') — U(z',y) > U(z,y') — U(z,y).) A sufficient condition
is U\2 > 0. Note that Ux2 = ^l~X0^ > 0. From strict super-modularity, a well-known
implication is that the policy function h is monotone. Then £[2t+i] = h(zt) > zt implies
that E[zt+2] = h2(zt) > h(zt) = E[zt+i}. Hence, a2 > 0. The converse is identical and
this establishes (a) since a2 > 0.
To prove part (2), note that if a2 > 1, the implied expected price path is explosive.
This implies strict losses for trader z, clearly a suboptimal strategy given the option to
not trade at all. It is easy to check, by simple but tedious calculus that a2 < a, implying
faster convergence. From the expression for a2, it is straightforward to check that a2 is a
decreasing function of 0j, establishing part (3).
 B
Remark: Recall that a2 = ^ . Since h(z) = (1 - \9j)z — Ag*(z), we see that:
i.e.. demand is a linear function of the price deviation. To complete the argument we
must show that there are linear strategies which are best responses to each other. Lemma
2 provides the basis for this result.
Lemma 2 Suppose that 1 — XOj > 0. Then:
1. The best response of trader i to trader ys strategy is:
q*{z) = OiiOfc . " (A.20)
where:
Jl - 3(1-X0,)2
2. The demand coefficient is strictly positive, i.e., 0i(0j) > 0.
3. The demand coefficient 0^(9j) is a continuous function of Qj, and satisfies the in
equality (1 - Aftfflj)) > 0.
4. The profits are a quadratic function of price deviation:
1 - y/l - 3{1 - XBj
2\d
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Proof of Lemma 2: For (1), Equation (A.20) is immediate from the preceding discussion.
Parts (2) and (3) are immediate. Note that a2 > 0 implies that 1 — \0i(0j) > 0. For
part (4), the characterization of the value function follows from (A. 15) and arguments
identical to those in proposition 1. .
To finish the proof, we now consider the case where (1 — \0j) < 0. In this case, the
expected price deviation in the next period, z(l — X0j), is the opposite sign of the initial
deviation, and prices are cyclical or explosive. It is straightforward to demonstrate that
such price paths cannot emerge in equilibrium. In the special case where (1 — X0j) — 0,
prices converge in a single step. Then, the proposition follows directly from Lemmas 1
and 2 by applying the Brouwer fixed point argument to the space [0, j] and the function
aw- •
Remark: It is straightforward to check that the arguments for the two insider case
generalize immediately to the N insider problem. Hence, we only state the appropriate
conclusion: there is a proportional trading rule 0*z which constitutes a Markov perfect
equilibrium; the expected rate of price converge is geometric at rate a^ and the profit of
each insider, in equilibrium, is given by
y [ 2 ( + ^
Proof of Proposition ??
Given that 0(N, X)(v — pt-i) is the trading strategy of the other N — 1 traders, the z-the
trader's maximization problem as a residual trader picking next period's price deviation
y, given the current price deviation z, is
j j
In (A.21) and henceforth in the proof we write 0 instead of 0(N,\). The first-order
condition and envelope theorem condition are the exact analogues of (A.14) and (A.15)




pEW'(y'1N,\) = 0 (A.22)
A
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Substituting (A.23) in (A.22) and using the fact that 6z is a best response in the above
problem (i.e., that y — (1 — N\0)z), we get:
- NX0)3 4- - NXO)2 - (1 - NX9) + A0 = 0 . (A.24)
Write 1 - NXO = a, i.e., \0 = ^ . Then,
(3(N - l )a 3 + /3a2 - (N + l )a + 1 = 0 (A.25)
Denote the function on the left hand side of (A.25), ((N,a). Elementary calculus yields
£2 = 33(N — l)a2 + 2(3a — (JV + 1). It is easy to see that this quadratic can have
at most one root in (0,1), i.e., ((N,-) has a single extremum in a € (0,1). Further,
(22 = 6Q(N — l )a + 20 > 0. i.e., the extremum is in fact a point at which ( attains a
minimum. Finally note that C(N, 0) = 1 and f (JV, 1) = N(/3 — 1) < 0. So there is exactly
one ct*(N) G (0,1) such that ((N, a*(N)) = 0.
We have proved 1. Notice further that d(iV,a) = (3a3 — a < 0. Hence, Nf > N
implies that a*(N') < am(N). So 2. is proved.
From the value function computed above, we have
W(z;N,\) =
By differentiating we get
N JVj A + 1 - t f 2 (A.26)
sgn W\ = sgn a*
- j i 2 A2
3. immediately follows. Note that a^ < 1, and decreasing in JV, implies that the convex
combination a^^—^ + -^ is decreasing in JV. From this 4. follows. Finally, 5. is proved by
noting that increasing JV to N + 1 leads to faster convergence than in the JV trader case,
i.e.. the aggregate informational rents are lower. .
Proof of Proposition 4




The proposition is proved by noting that ^ 1 + y^j ^ f^ ls decreasing in A if and only if
A3 - 1-/3 2 ' I
Proof of Proposition 5
The price revision rule can be written as:
zt = zt- (A.28)
In other words,
E[zt] = - t - i — (A.29)
Denote, as before, z = zt-i, y = Ezt, x = xt, and furthermore, Q = Qt-i- The Bellman
equation is
- XQ - \q - Ax)9 + 0W(z - \Q-\q-\x,q + x)\ .W(z, Q) =
Again it will be more convenient to think of the insider as the residual trader who
picks the expected price deviation y. Hence,
fz-y-XQ
W(z,Q) = max A A (A.30)
We will investigate the following conjecture for the value function and optimal trading
strategy respectively: W(z,Q) = a0 + axz2 + a2zQ + a3Q2 and q(z,Q) — Bxz — (1 — 02)Q.










The first-order condition from (A.31) yields, upon simplification:
(1 + (3a2)(z - 2y - AQ) + 23 (Xa.y -^-(z-y- XQ)) = 0 . (A.32)
26
Upon substituting the conjectured trading strategy we get:
(l + 0a 2 ) (2A0 1 - l )+2 .0 (Aa 1 ( l -A0 1 ) -0 1 a 3 ) = 0 (A.33)
= 0 . (A.34)
Furthermore. (A.31) implies (by matching coefficients and then rearranging terms)
ao(l — <3) = /3<TX(A a.\ — Xa2 + 03)
a2(02-2A0102 + A 0 1 - l ) = (1 -A0 1 ) (0 2 -1 )
=
 7{
- a3(02 - 2





Given the symmetry in the pairs of equations, (A.33)- (A.34) and (A.36)-(A.38), a
natural conjecture is that A^ = <92 and 04A2 = a3. Substituting in (A.33) and simplifying,
we get
(202-1) 23a3A = 0 . (A.39)
Likewise (A.36) yields
a3[l - ;i(l - 02)2\ = 02A(1 - - 02)X + a3022] . (A.40)
In fact, suppose that a3 = bX (and hence, al = j). Then. (A.39) yields b —
Upon substituting this in (A.40) we get
or
l _ j ( l _ / ? 2 ) 2 = ^{2-01). (A.41)
(A.41) can be seen to have a solution in (0,1), for all 0 > | (which we will assume is the
case). By successive substitution the values of a0, 6, a2, and 9\ can now be determined.
The form of the optimal trading strategy, (13), and the discounted insider profits, (14),
have therefore been established.
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To see that the price convergence is independent of A, recall that E[zt\ = (^ — ^ 0\)zt-\ —
A02Qt-i- Since \9\ is independent of A (it is equal to 02 which can be seen from (A.41)
to be independent of A) and since QQ = 0, it follow that E\z\\ = az0 and E[Q\] = &• z.
In particular. E[z\\ is independent of A and E[Q\] is inversely proportional to A. By
induction it follows that E[zt] is independent of A (and E[Qt] is inversely proportional to
A). The proposition is proved. _
Proof of Proposition 8
First, consider the selection criterion (Cl). As pt — pf_i = X(N9(v — pt-\) + Xt),
the excess transaction- to-transaction price variance, for a given fundamental value 2,
is cr2(pt — Pt-i) = A2crJ. This variance represents the excess volatility in transaction-
to- transaction returns introduced by transitory demand shocks, as the demands of the
informed traders are deterministic functions of z. Clearly, satisfying (Cl) implies choosing
the smallest level of A consistent with non-negative specialist profits. (Note that this is
the same action that would be chosen if the objective were to minimize the unconditional
price variance, as the permanent price changes are not affected by continuity requirements
over the long-run.)
Let IIs denote the expected trading profits of the specialist, i.e., IIs = E[(pt — v)Qt].
Then, from our previous results it follows immediately that:
IT = E[{Pt^ + \(N0(v - p^) + xt) - v)(N0(v - p,_! + xt)\. (A.42)
Then:
IF = E[aN6(v - p^)2 + \x]) , (A.43)
where a = 1 — A./V0 is a constant. From Proposition 3, we know that a = —^4 is
independent of A and that iV0 = (1 — o;)/A. Then, we can write the specialist's expected
profits as a function of A:
n5(A) = - a ( l - a)al\-1 + Xa2x. (A.44)
From equation (A.52), we see that IP(A) is strictly increasing in A. Intuitively, higher
values of A reduce the expected losses to informed traders and increase the expected gains
from trading with uninformed traders. Clearly, the ex ante expected discounted profits
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of the specialist are proportional to the II3, where the proportionality constant depends
only on the discount factor, (3. Thus, setting II* = 0, we see there exists a unique value
of A given by Ao = ^ a ( l — a ^ / o v satisfying (Cl).
For (C2), we simply note that trading is a zero sum game, so that the expected
profits of the informed and uninformed traders collectively are the expected losses of the
market maker. Thus, setting the specialist's expected profits equal to zero is equivalent to
satisfying criterion (C2). From equation (A.52), this yields the same value of A as criterion
(Cl). For (C3), we note that depth is just A"1, so by the earlier arguments, the same
rule is chosen. Finally, for criterion (C4), we can choose a limit L such that L = AQ<7J.
As specialist profits are increasing in A, the specialist chooses the same continuity rule as
selected under (Cl)-(C3). .
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